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 EXCESS DEMAND AND RATIONING: SELLING TO AN INPUT
LUTZ-ALEXANDER BUSCH AND PHIL CURRY
Abstract. This paper develops a model that explains the persistence of excess
demand for some goods. It oﬀers that, for some goods, consumers care about who
else is consuming the good. As such, their willingness to pay depends on their
beliefs about the other consumers. We demonstrate that screening mechanisms
that impose costs in negative correlation to an individual’s (positive) externality
can increase proﬁts while appearing to generate excess demand. We feel that such
a model is appropriate in that casual observation seems to indicate that it does well
in predicting which goods would use such a screening mechanism and which would
not.
Keywords: equilibrium excess demand, pricing, distributional waits, scalping
JEL Classiﬁcation:
1. Introduction
There are some goods for which excess demand seems to be the norm. These goods
include concert and sporting tickets, as well some games and toys
1, especially when
they are ﬁrst introduced. The fact that excess demand is so persistent for these
goods suggests that it may in fact be optimal for the producer. The literature has
produced several models that lead to the creation of excess demand being part of
a price setter’s proﬁt maximization behavior. Many of these models entail demand
uncertainty, either on behalf of the price setter
2, or on behalf of the consumer
3. Other
models tell a story of price discrimination between low and high value customers
4.
We thank Pascal Courty for very helpful comments. The ﬁrst author acknowledges research
support from The Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.
1See, for example Wolpin’s (1989) analysis of the excess demand for Nintendo’s Super Mario
Brothers.
2See Harris and Raviv (1981).
3See DeGraba (1995) and Courty (2003) and (2005).
4See Png (1991), Slade (1991) and Gilbert and Klemperer (2000).
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This paper oﬀers another explanation, in which customers care about who else is
purchasing the good and rationing can act as a screening mechanism.
We consider an environment in which the utility an individual derives from the
consumption of a good depends on the attributes of the other consumers. For example,
the enjoyment of a concert, movie or sporting event can be inﬂuenced by the behavior
of others in attendance. For popular music concerts and most sporting events, being
part of an audience that cheers lustily can greatly enhance the experience. Such
behavior could detract from the enjoyment of an opera, however. Many children’s
toys are designed to be played with by more than one child at a time. If the toy
is such that a skill at playing the game is developed over time, such as with video
games, then the child’s enjoyment of the toy would be increased if his or her friends
also had the toy and developed their skill at a similar pace. In such an environment,
an individual’s willingness to pay depends on who else in consuming the good. As
such, individuals are not just potential customers, they are also inputs.
If a monopolist had perfect knowledge about each person’s willingness to pay and
their quality as an input to other people’s enjoyment of the good, it could face a
tradeoﬀ between selling to a person willing to pay a lot for the good but did not do
much for the enjoyment of other people, and one that was not willing to pay very
much but contributed greatly to other people’s experiences. In such a case, it could
certainly be possible that the monopolist would prefer to sell to the latter, or the
one with the lower willingness to pay. In the absence of such information, however,
the monopolist would like to ﬁnd a mechanism that screened potential customers
according to these characteristics in order to achieve maximal proﬁts. The use of
such a screening mechanism would lead to the appearance of excess demand. That
is, there would be people who did not purchase the good that were willing to pay
more than the monetary price but were not willing to do whatever the screening
mechanism required. One of the contributions of this paper is to explicitly model the
rationing process so that the market is in equilibrium once all costs are taken into
consideration.EXCESS DEMAND AND RATIONING 3
The screening mechanism we consider in this paper entails imposing costs on the
customer that are inversely proportional to that individual’s quality as an input.
We consider such a mechanism because we feel that examples can be found. The
purchase of tickets for concerts, or even some movies such as the Star Wars ﬁlms,
often requires lining up for lengthy periods of time. For example, Star Wars: Episode
I - The Phantom Menace opened on May 19th, 1999 worldwide. In the United
States and Canada, ticket lineups started more than a month in advance
5. While the
opportunity cost of time may have varied across the people in line, lining up was as
much a social event as it was a means to get tickets
6. Bands often release tickets
through their fan clubs and sites ﬁrst, and radio stations frequently hold contests for
tickets and goods (such as the new Nintendo game system) in which people must
demonstrate how much of a fan they are (i.e. their quality as an input). It seem
that it is a regular occurrence that goods and tickets are often made available to a
subset of the population before becoming widely available. This model predicts that
this group of people should be “desirable” in the sense that others would be willing
to pay more knowing that this group has already purchased.
Formally, we introduce a screening mechanism by incorporating ideas of distribu-
tional waits (Bucovetsky, 1984) and waiting time auctions (Holt and Sherman, 1982).
More precisely, we consider the monopolist to be selling the commodity under a two
part pricing mechanism, one part of which is a regular (monetary) price, the other
part of which is a non-monetary price, which can be thought of as any cost a poten-
tial customer has to jump through in order to obtain a ticket. Whatever the precise
component, the important part is that it introduces a utility cost to customers (which
is separate and potentially diﬀerently distributed than the monetary cost across cus-
tomers). In our model, any mechanism that imposes fewer costs on customers that
5“When Will They Start Lining Up?”, March 8, 1999, http://www.imdb.com/news/sb/1999-03-
08#ﬁlm6 and “The Wait Gets Shorter”, April 26, 1999, http://www.imdb.com/news/sb/1999-04-
26#ﬁlm1.
6See http://www.liningup.net for photos and descriptions of the events held during the lineups
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have higher qualities as inputs would be eﬀective for selecting the most desired cus-
tomers. We call such a mechanism a “line-up” even if it does not entail actually
waiting in a line. By asking customers to wait in line in order to purchase a ticket,
the promoter can ensure that low-quality customers, who are willing to pay a higher
monetary price but are less willing to stand in line, do not attend. This leads to
a better concert experience (a higher level of the consumption externality) which
increases everyone’s willingness to pay. We begin by showing that the monopolist
maximizes proﬁts with a line-up when there exists a negative correlation between
quality as an input and willingness to pay if the amount high-quality (but low in-
come) customers are willing to pay for the best concert experience is greater than the
amount the low-quality (but high income) customers are willing to pay for the worst
concert experience.
We then consider whether correlation between a consumer’s willingness to pay and
her desired attribute is necessary for line-ups. We address this point by considering
a version of the model where both attributes of consumers are (jointly) uniformly
distributed. In this setting it can be shown that some line-up will be used if the value
of the externality to a consumer is large enough, where this critical value (positively)
depends on the capacity constraint.
This model generates some testable predictions about the use of screening. In the
model, buyers of tickets have two private attributes: one is their willingness/ability
to pay (which is a function of who else is consuming), the other is a private attribute
which contributes to a (positive) consumption externality. If an agent’s quality as
an input is positively correlated with their willingness/ability to pay, then we show
that the monopolist will simply clear the market by setting a high enough price. In
other words, for events such as the opera, where viewing members of “high society”
may be part of the enjoyment, we should not expect to observe persistent excess
demand.
7 However, if the desired attribute is either negatively or not correlated with
willingness/ability to pay, then the promoter may choose to screen for the desired
7A January 27, 2007 search of the New York Craigslist site (http://www.craigslist.com) found
397 posts from people either looking for or selling Knicks tickets. A random sampling of these posts
found that sellers always mentioned the face value and mentioned they would take the best oﬀer.EXCESS DEMAND AND RATIONING 5
attribute using the non-monetary price. If it is true that tickets to sporting events
typically either go to true fans or corporations (who would be low-quality as an
input, but have high willingness to pay), then we should expect to see line-ups and
promotions to fan clubs as common occurrences, which they seem to be.
The idea that people may care about who else consumes a good is not wholly
new, given the fairly broad literature going back to Veblen’s (1899) observation that
one consumer’s demands may well depend on those of other consumers. A common
name for this eﬀect is that of “social externalities,” as in Becker (1991), although
Becker considers the valuation a consumer places on a commodity to depend on
the level of consumption by others as opposed to the attributes of those others.
Becker shows how the dependence of one consumer’s demand on aggregate quantity
demand can lead to a positive relationship between price and aggregate quantity
demanded. Together with a capacity constraint in this upward sloping region, the
proﬁt maximizing ﬁrm may then be able to increase price without lowering quantity
demanded and (if constrained) without lowering sales.
DeSerpa and Faith (1996) construct the analogous result for a “mob good”. In
their setup customers are heterogeneous in an attribute (they call it “noise”) which
increases the willingness to pay of all customers, but which is inversely related to
customer’s base willingness to pay. The monopolist then has an incentive to reduce
price in order to attract higher noise customers. With a capacity constraint and line-
up customers are chosen randomly to obtain a ticket, and the resulting expected level
of noise exceeds that of the situation where the price is market clearing. This makes
no assumption as to the correlation between an individual’s quality as an input and
their willingness to pay and is much more explicit about the rationing mechanism.
Both of these models have customers who, in equilibrium, are rationed. That is,
customers who are willing to pay more than the monetary price but do not obtain a
ticket. This raises the usual question of how the demand behavior of those customers
ought to be modiﬁed in order to be consistent. After all, normal demand curves are
Another search found 82 posts for opera tickets. A random sampling of these posts found that sellers
mentioned face value and indicated a selling price below.6 L-A. BUSCH AND P. CURRY
derived under the assumption (by the consumer) that any quantity she demands can
be obtained. In this paper we present a model which is consistent.
In our model, the marginal consumer is just indiﬀerent between attempting to
purchase a ticket and not doing so in equilibrium. In both Becker (1991) and DeSerpa
and Faith (1996) it is not clear if the marginal customer actually would line up, since
no explicit allowance is made for the fact that some customers do not get served.
While in the versions presented here the marginal customer is also served, that is not
necessary. The model can easily be extended to accommodate some customers not
being served
8. Put diﬀerently, in the model presented below the market clears ex ante
if price and line-up costs are taken into account. Nevertheless this model can address
excess demand as it is described in, for example, Becker (1991): Once tickets are
allocated via the monopolist’s mechanism, opportunities for re-trading exist. More
precisely, at the posted face value of a ticket (but without having to incur line-up
costs) there exists excess demand, i.e., many more customers are willing to pay the
face value than there are seats. The presence of scalpers is only indicative of this fact,
not actual unserved customers at the initial selling stage.
An interesting implication for the resale of tickets arises when promoters use line-
ups as a screening mechanism. If customers are allowed to resell their tickets at any
price, then promoters are unable to use line-ups as a screening mechanism. High
income customers with high line-up costs (but with low quality) are willing to pay
more for a ticket in the absence of a line-up. So, once low income customers with
low line-up costs have purchased a ticket, they would like to sell their ticket to a
high income customer. However, in this framework there is a good reason for anti-
scalping legislation. The seller and buyer are also in a second supplier-demander
relationship where the buyer of the ticket supplies the input. If the buyer is allowed
to resell, then that is tantamount to input substitution. The quality of the input will
be aﬀected and thus the buyer of the input suﬀers economic damages if the supplier
8In the model as presented, customers in the line-up can be viewed as all being served at the
same time. If a waiting line auction as in Holt and Sherman (1982) is used instead, customers are
served ﬁrst-come-ﬁrst-served, and thus have to line up earlier in order to ensure tickets. The only
modiﬁcation from a standard auction is the fact that loosing customers also pay a price.EXCESS DEMAND AND RATIONING 7
of the input is allowed to substitute (resell). As a result, the concert experience
is diminished for all. Resale, however, would be foreseeable, and so the promoter
would not be able to use line-ups as a screening mechanism and so would sell only to
the high income/low quality customers at a lower price. Anti-scalping laws are thus
eﬃciency enhancing/preserving. If resale is legal only at the posted price, then the
ticket holders will not want to resell, and so the input quality is preserved. Courty
(2003) also considers the implications of resale. He ﬁnds that monopolists cannot do
better by allowing resale, which is also true in our model. Our model has implications
for eﬃciency, however, which are not present in Courty.
The outline of this paper is as follows. In the next section we present the general
model and demonstrate that equilibria with positive line-ups exist. Section 3 will
consider a version with perfect (positive or negative) correlation between the variables,
in which case more precise results can be obtained. Section 4 considers the eﬀect of
anti-scalping laws. The conclusion follows.
2. The Model
There is a continuum of potential customers and a monopolist. While this model
applies broadly, we shall use terminology applicable to the sale of concert tickets.
As such, we shall refer to the monopolist as a concert promoter and to the sale of
concert tickets. Customers will similarly be referred to as fans and concert attendees.
Each customer is characterized by two values, (vi,qi), normalized to lie in [0,1]2.
The value of these is private information to the customer. The interpretation of vi
is the valuation of that customer for a ticket to a concert of minimal quality. The
interpretation of qi is that customer’s ‘quality’ as a concert goer. This measures the
amount of (positive) externality that the given customer contributes to the concert
experience if he attends.9 Suppose that there is a unit mass of consumers who are
distributed on the unit square [0,1]2 according to some probability density f(v,q).
9In other words, vi is a (private) consumption value for the customer, while qi is a (private)
production value of the customer to the promoter.8 L-A. BUSCH AND P. CURRY
Let fV(v) and fQ(q) denote the marginal distributions and let fV |Q(v|q) and fQ|V(q|v)
denote the conditional distributions.
Aside from the idiosyncratic private valuation of the concert, given by vi, there
also exists a common value component, made up from the contributions of all those
attending through their qi. Denote this common value component, or concert experi-
ence, by e. It is assumed that the individual contributions to the concert experience
are aggregated in such a way that e depends only on the average quality of those in
attendance and that all consumers have the same valuation of the concert experience.
Speciﬁcally, it is assumed that there exists a continuous and diﬀerentiable function
e(q), where q denotes the average qi of the attendees. Note that since there is a
continuum of customers, a single individual’s contribution to the concert experience
is zero. This formulation also has the advantage that it does not build in a preference
for either large or small events.
Concert tickets are sold via a two part pricing system: one part is a monetary price,
denoted p, which corresponds to the face value of the ticket. The second part is a
non-monetary component, denoted by `, which can be thought of as the line length
or any other special procedures a fan has to follow in order to qualify for purchasing
a ticket. Other such features may include the cost of having to make plans far in
advance of the concert date, or having to spend time searching for the exact moment
of the start of online ticket sales. Each potential customer has a money-equivalent
cost for `. The cost of lining up may depend on various personal characteristics, such
as one’s wage (i.e. the opportunity cost of time). One characteristic which we wish
to consider is the customer’s quality component qi. In particular, we wish to consider
the possibility of an inverse relationship between qi and the cost of lining up. This
may arise from a greater sense of anticipation while physically lining up, or from
easier access to information about online ticket sales. The cost of lining up is thus
denoted by C (q,`), where C` (·) > 0 and Cq (·) < 0.EXCESS DEMAND AND RATIONING 9
3. Profit Maximization
The promoter maximizes proﬁts by choosing (p,`):
max
p,`
(p − c)N(p,`) − F (1)
where c is the (constant) marginal cost of an additional ticket sale. Such costs may
include the printing of the ticket and the marginal cost of renting a larger venue. F









where the derivative with respect to ` holds with equality if the optimal level of ` is
positive. Given that p > c for positive proﬁts, a necessary condition for the promoter
to use a lineup is
∂N(·)
∂` > 0 for some `. That is, aggregate demand must be increasing
in the lineup length at least somewhere.10 In order to analyze aggregate demand, the
following section considers the behavior of consumers in response to changes in ticket
prices and lineup lengths.
4. Consumer Behavior
Total customer utility from the purchase of a ticket for a concert with externality
level e at price p and line length ` is given by
Vi = vi + e(q) − p − C(qi,`).
The reservation utility level is normalized to 0 for all consumers. A given consumer
assuming a concert experience of e(q) will therefore purchase a ticket at (p,`) if
Vi(p,`,q) = vi + e(q) − p − C(qi,`) ≥ 0.
Hence, we get a relationship between v and q with consumers who have higher v
and/or q buying, and those with lower values not buying. This deﬁnes a line in [0,1]2













Figure 1. Diﬀerent Purchasing regions
given by
(2) v = p − e(q) + C(q,`).
Note that dv/ dq = Cq(q,`) ≤ 0, and that the region of buying customers is convex
if Cqq(q,`) ≥ 0. Some examples are given in Figure 1. In Figure 1 the lines denote
marginal customers for diﬀerent values of p, q, and `. All customers above a given
line wish to purchase a ticket at these values, all those below do not.11 Also note that
a change in either p or e(q) causes a (parallel) shift of the line of marginal consumers
(up if either p increases or e(q) decreases.) However, a change in ` shifts the curves
up but also changes the slope. The slope becomes steeper if C`q (·) < 0 and ﬂatter if
C`q (·) > 0.
11This follows from the fact that ∂V (·)/∂vi = 1 > 0 and ∂V (·)/∂qi = −Cq(·) > 0 by assumption.EXCESS DEMAND AND RATIONING 11
The number of customers and their average quality are found by simultaneously














qf(v,q) dv dq (4)
Since these equations are continuous maps from [0,1]
2 to [0,1]
2, a ﬁxed point occurs
and there exists a solution. It is assumed that the corresponding Jacobian matrix is
positive semi-deﬁnite so that this solution is unique for every pair (p,`). Denote the
determinant of the Jacobian by |J|. Of particular interest is how N and q change as
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v qf (v,q) dv dq
N |J|
=
E [q|v = v] − q
N |J|
where v = p−e(q)+C (q,`). Note that an increase in p always decreases attendance
while the eﬀect on average quality is ambiguous. In particular, the average quality
of attendees will increase (decrease) if the marginal attendee is of greater (lesser)
quality than the average. It should be further noted that if v and q are independent
so that f (v,q) = fv (v)fq (q), then an increase in p has no eﬀect on average quality
or concert experience.
The eﬀect of ` on N and q is more complex and depends on Cq` (·) as well as the
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C` (·)f (v,q) dq
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0 f (v,q) dq < 0
and the promoter would never use lineups when maximizing proﬁts. This leads us to
the following lemma:
Lemma 1. A necessary condition for a promoter to use lineups in order to maximize
proﬁts is that there exists correlation between an agent’s quality as an input and
his/her willingness to line up. Formally, a necessary condition for the promoter to
choose ` > 0 is C`q < 0.
However, contrary to the impression left by previous work, it is not necessary
that there exist correlation between an individual’s quality as an input and his/her
valuation of the concert:
Proposition 1. Correlation between an individual’s quality as an input, q, and
his/her willingness to pay, v is not necessary for a promoter to use a lineup to
maximize proﬁts.
This proposition is proved via an example. Suppose v and q are independent
and distributed uniformly on the unit square. Then f(v,q) = fQ(q) = fV(v) =
fQ|V(q|v) = fV |Q(v,q) = 1. Let the consumer’s utility from the concert experience
be e(q) = αq, α ≤ 2 and the cost function be C (q,`) = (1 − q)` so that Vi =
vi − p + αq − (1 − q)`. If the promoter does not use a line, then the average quality
will be 1
2 for any price he might set and he maximizes proﬁts by choosing p = 1
2 + α
4.






Note that if the promoter does use a line, then v = p−αq+(1−q)` deﬁnes a linear
relationship between q and v, where ∂v
∂q = −`. Suppose that the promoter chooses
the line length and price such that consumers in the area depicted in Figure 2 attend
the concert. Note that the slope of the line in the ﬁgure is −2, so that the line length
must be 2. The area of this region is 1
4. Since the average quality of consumers in
this region is 5
6, the promoter must choose a price of 5α
6 in order for this to be the
















Figure 2. When the promoter chooses ` = 2 and p = 5α
6 , consumers
in the region in the upper right corner above the line attend the concert.
The promoter’s proﬁts in this scenario are therefore 5α
24. These proﬁts are greater




















For example, if c = 2, then the promoter makes greater proﬁts from this line and
price pair when α ∈ (2.4,4.8), approximately. If α = 4, then the promoter makes
proﬁts of 1
4 without a lineup and proﬁts of 1
3 with this particular lineup.
5. Conclusion
This paper has added to the literature on social externalities and mob goods in two
dimensions. One is that it presents a closed model in which line-ups are consistent
with equilibrium behavior. The other is that it corrects a possible misconception left
by previous work, namely that a negative correlation between a consumer’s quality
and her willingness to pay for the good is necessary. What is necessary for line-ups
to occur in equilibrium (and possible rationing), is that the consumer’s quality and
utility cost of line-ups be correlated. It is not necessary, however, that the correlation
extend to the willingness to pay.
Given that a positive social externality is supplied by a high quality consumer
(however that may be deﬁned) the proﬁt maximizing ﬁrm has an incentive to screen14 L-A. BUSCH AND P. CURRY
for just such consumers for the sole reason that it increases proﬁts. It coincidentally
also increases social welfare. Scalping, that is, the resale of tickets without the utility
cost of waiting, would jeopardize both. The ﬁrm loses proﬁts because only high
willingness to pay (but low quality) consumers could be attracted, but social welfare
also declines, since the level of the externality is reduced. Anti-scalping legislation
therefore is not necessarily an attempt to increase private proﬁts, but can be viewed
as a welfare enhancing measure, a point ﬁrst observed by DeSerpa and Faith (1996).
It is interesting to note that it is not resale per s` e, but resale at a higher than posted
price which is the problem, since at the posted price no ticket holder would wish
to sell. Hence the observed policy of allowing resale at prices up to the face value
appears to be welfare maximizing.
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